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The Morality of Military Ethics Education
Roger Wertheimer
Introduction: Modern militarism institutionalizes an ethos of 
professionalism. The model is the American military, the wealthiest, history’s most 
world-dominant. Its professionalism is an occupational spirit of self-improvement. A 
military is not truly professionalized without a program of Professional Military 
Education (PME) with two primary assignments: the acquisition and transmission of the 
knowledge and skills that maximize military proficiency, and the transmission and 
perpetuation of the ethos of professionalism -- the mission of Professional Military Ethics
Education (PMEE). 
American professionalism is an Enlightenment ethos. The American military is 
subject to the basic Enlightenment moral imperatives governing the fundamental laws of 
the nation it serves. A military has an inherent imperative to maximize its proficiency in 
attaining its military objectives. The morality of the American military is an evolving 
negotiation of independent imperatives from independent legitimating sources.
This essay is about the interplay of distinct, often competing imperatives within 
the morality of modern militarism exemplified in America’s best PMEE practices: its 
Department of Defense (DoD) academies training officers for its Air Force (USAFA), 
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Army (USMA aka West Point) and Navy and Marine Corps (USNA aka Annapolis). 
These schools are the focus because they are the best we’ve got and I know them best -- 
from two years of continuous personal observation advising USNA administrators about 
their PMEE programs, and from a consequent network of contacts at all the academies.1 
Since American PMEE derived from European models and has since influenced PMEE 
worldwide, my observations should resonate with PMEE practitioners and participants 
elsewhere.2
Respect: Over the past half-century military culture has been revolutionizing
itself, or trying to. The moral progress of military professionalism is best learned, not 
from its academy required courses on military ethics and military law, but from those on 
leadership. Oversimplifying, the ethics courses are more concerned with how to reason 
about exceptional situations; the leadership courses with how a leader is to act day-to-
day. Future leaders are presently taught that true leaders live by some Kantianesque 
principle of respect. 
Professionalism has taken the tyranny out of military authoritarianism. 
Insubordination is not met with brutality. Leadership texts teach the modern management 
practices predicated on current social science (organizational theory, personality theory, 
etc.) Officers are to be managers and leaders, not dictators. Respect is to run all down the 
line, as well as up.
In our current civil society, public denials of the principle of respect are beyond 
the pale. Military professionalism salutes the principle and declares a commitment to the 
Enlightenment ideals of equality, fraternity, and respect. Yet, civil society, in the USA and
elsewhere, has spent two centuries in conflicts, institutional and interpersonal, over the 
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interpretation and application of those ideals. Still today, a million times every day, 
people get astonished to learn that someone else regards this or that act or utterance as 
disrespectful. What respect calls for in a democratic civil society will always be 
controversial when you get down to cases.3 What you learn about the demands of respect 
in that world is unreliable guidance for success in the military world.
The military is profoundly unlike a business corporation. Successful business 
leaders can be disastrous Defense Department managers when they really don’t get it that
the military is morally unlike any civilian organization. From the outside, it is one among
many component organizations comprising our communal totality, our nation, our 
culture. From the inside the military is its own world, a societally sanctioned semi-
autonomous legal order, politically isolated, detached from our democracy. This 
organization has an authoritarian structure condemned by our basic constitutional 
principles, and by Kant’s conception of a respect due all persons -- condemned 
everywhere except in the military.  And prisons. 
We all create, sustain, and certify this organization to secure our most essential 
goal, the survival of our nation, our lives, our homes and pussy cats. To that end, we 
presume ourselves entitled to empower this organization to do the most horrible, horrible,
horrible things to millions of other human beings when we so direct it – and  to demand 
that this organization evaluate  and structure everything within it -- all of its equipment, 
practices and human relationships -- by their contribution to military proficiency. The 
dominant message we twitter to military managers seems to say that they are to live by 
the principle of maximizing military proficiency, and thus regard and treat everything 
under their command as a means to achieving our most elemental end. We empower these
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managers to enforce compliance coercively. They are not answerable to civilian courts. 
The leader’s word is the law of the world. Of course, getting what they want when and 
how they want it still takes skill. Compliance as intended is hardly automatic. Still, 
military directives don’t risk meeting responses of “I quit; I’ll work for a competitor.” 
Open-palmed or fisted, their gloved hands are mailed. What respect down the line there 
demands is limited by what respect down the line is possible there.
Within this world, its new professionalism commands a new respect for the 
principle of respect. The venerable debasement of Privates and Plebes, once glorified, is 
now prohibited and sternly condemned with some consistency. That prohibition is 
dramatic, symbolic, and it ramifies throughout academy and armed forces culture. It 
nicely exemplifies much of the new leadership style. Constraining hazing and harsh 
training has been an evolutionary process going back to the late 19th century, taking hold 
in the 1950’s, and accelerating in the morally anxious post-Vietnam military. The data 
points of the leisurely sloped learning curve are events of moral discovery, controversy 
and official redefinitions regarding the specific forms and degrees of humiliation and 
abuse deemed consistent with due respect for bottom dwellers. 
Formal prohibitions from the highest authorities are impotent when stated in 
terms like “disrespect” or “hazing” – until some communal understanding develops 
regarding the relevant, specific, precise criteria determining the proper application of 
such terms in a particular case. What one’s superiors’ will deem proper may still be 
uncertain. Time after time leaders get dismayed by the discovery (and embarrassed if it’s 
published) that, despite their ever-so clear, prominently-posted directives, some of their 
most decorated boot camp DI’s or student commanders keep dishing routinized cruelties, 
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physical and/or psychological, with the purest devotion to sacred duty. Leaders get 
confounded by their trusted culprits’ conduct, and even more by their sense of betrayal 
for being punished for their contributions to military proficiency. 
What the accused or convicted say when confronted may be dishonest or self-
deluded rationalizations masking ignoble motives of sadism, or callousness, or 
inexcusable insensitivity. Never mind. The rationalizations would not (be thought to) 
serve the self if they weren’t (thought to be) appealing to principles recognized by the 
opposing perspective. Before and after conviction the condemned’s defense is the 
argument of the old guard professionals who lost the cultural battle: to wit, however 
humiliating or painful, the training regimen is permissible and required insofar as it is 
permitted and required to maximize military proficiency.  
The once honored old guard and the new culprits have lost out to new 
professionals who say or suppose that the military can’t be entitled to deny or disregard 
the principle of respect. Our social contract assumes that we all have reason enough to 
accept our subordination to military superiors, but our consent would be crazy and 
incapable of legitimating anything if we allowed the military absolute and unlimited 
power over us as mere means to its end. Our own self-respect demands that we not 
authorize an organization that disregards our demand for respect. We’d lose our self-
respect enlisting in a military that permits disrespect unnecessary for maximizing military
proficiency.
Few old guard professionals have been so impolitic as to deny this, publicly. Most
see no need to since they are certain that while of course there are limits to the harms 
trainers can inflict, the humiliation and suffering they’ve always allowed are well within 
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those bounds, and they are indispensable for achieving the needed discipline so essential 
for successful combat. Even limp-wristed new professionals must admit that they cannot 
absolutely prohibit all acts causing pain or humiliation. That’s infeasible even in the 
civilian world.4 The new guard must realize that they still permit and require trainers to 
inflict far greater humiliation and physical discomfort to achieve their goals than our 
society allows elsewhere. Old professionals say they are just as consistently respectful. 
The issue is never whether disrespect is justifiable, but only when and how much 
disrespect is needed to get the job done and fulfill their solemn duty. They’ll concede the 
possibility of their being wrong on the facts, but their confidence has the strength and size
of their enormous collective experience. 
They say (in so many words): “If new professionals’ sensibilities are so offended 
by the conduct we commend, if they honestly feel that such treatment is beyond the pale 
of what military proficiency can justify, we must respectfully submit that they are not 
entitled to risk our nation’s survival just to suit their sensitivities, so to them we say ‘Suck
it up or get out’ – unless we’re given good reason for deferring to a sensibility so contrary
to our near two century honored traditions, and still longer traditions of respected allies.  
We rest with the challenge to convince us that the limits of disrespect you lay down don’t 
compromise our security, or, if they do, they are nonetheless limits that reasonable social 
contractors would unanimously demand despite their compromising their security.” 5
Some of military professionalism finest minds have been enthralled by (their 
understanding of) Kant’s conception of the call of duty and the demands of respect. They 
conscientiously live by it and devote themselves to instilling this attitude in their students 
and their other subordinates. They may get queasy from a hasty reading of occasional 
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Kant comments6, and then reassured by finding nothing they cannot reconcile with their 
own training practices.
However, officers who suppose Pure Reason alone can identify the specific 
conduct respect demands should read beyond the Grundlegung and consider how many 
of the Master’s specific judgments on the matter they approve, and how many they are 
appalled or amused by. Apparently, though his contemporary armies allowed more 
brutality and servility then our own old guard could stomach, Kant wasn’t moved to 
criticize it.  Military Kantians may fairly insist that commitment to Kantian principles 
entails no commitment to Kant’s application of them in every case. What commitments 
are entailed remain to be explained.
Consider: However much honest consideration is given to the feelings and wishes 
of a slave, what can be the character of respect of any of his master’s actions as long as 
the master assumes himself entitled to own and control the slave as chattel? What role 
can the principle of respect play in military morality beyond that of a side-constraint on 
the principle of maximizing military proficiency setting some upper-bound on 
permissible acts elsewhere deemed disrespectful? If in fact that is its current role, how is 
the quality of respect of any individual action to be assessed in a world of human 
relationships whose power structure, practices and policies are fixed and certified by this 
ethos? Can there be any defensible, operational criteria for determining the upper bound 
of permissibly inflicted pain or humiliation in general or in some situations, or is the 
determination ultimately, irredeemably arbitrary, a function of a superior’s sensibilities? 
Those who violate the new standards and those who defend them are accused of 
sadism, savagery, cruelty. They retort with accusations of the opposite vice: the new 
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professionals are egregiously soft-hearted moral cowards caving in to a corrupted civilian
culture, so corrupted that its respect for people’s rights and liberties now entitles everyone
to talk and act in ways previously regarded scandalously disrespectful. It is a culture so 
corrupted that its respect for women now obliges the military to jeopardize the unit 
cohesion and good order and discipline indispensable for combat proficiency just to the 
satisfy some girls’ whims to play macho man.  Kantians can parry that, plausibly 
claiming that their accommodations to cultural shifts are principled, prompted not by 
political expedience, but by respect for each of the great mass of recruits and plebes and 
their socially sanctioned conceptions of proper respect.
Assessing aspersions of ignoble motivations is a mug’s game. My own sense of 
current military professionalism is colored by an absence of evidence of some sudden 
massive conversion to Kantianism. I’ve rarely caught officers consulting Kantian texts 
when they aren’t teaching an ethics class. Instead I see officers imbued with the spirit of 
professionalism ready to guide their lives by the findings of science, including the 
currently dominant theories of social science. Looking at their leadership texts, it seems 
that the dominant motivation for the new professionals comes from their being convinced
that social science has demonstrated that leadership respect down the line is absolutely 
essential for securing the respect up the line absolutely essential for military managers 
and leaders to operate effectively. But, once more, causal conjectures here are bottomless 
pits of controversy, and as guides for the future their value gets madly exaggerated.
The fact beyond dispute and indisputably important is that our leaders-to-be are 
being taught to develop and strengthen habits of respect in every direction, down the line,
up it, and horizontally, just because this respect contributes to military proficiency. The 
252
texts may have a passage or two hinting at some other rationale, but the dominant 
message drowning out all others is that our officers must value and enforce respect for 
persons because of its military utility. 
Meanwhile, the rationale for requiring respect future leaders find in their ethics 
course Kant readings is a paradigm of impenetrable philosophical obscurity.  Among the 
rare and precious certainties is that Kantian respect is not predicated on its managerial 
utility. It seems likely, if not apodictic, that a respect so motivated ultimately regards its 
objects as mere means to organizational ends.
Whys:    What is the motivation for our military service academies? Like many of its 
allies, America’s expenditures for developing the character of its military officers dwarf 
the budgets for enhancing anyone else’s virtuousness. Aside from scattered occasional 
efforts by local governments at lower school levels, our political and secular civilian 
institutions generally expend little real time and money empowering the conscience of its 
citizenry or its civilian professionals. There’s no end to ways governmental and other 
public institutions, intentionally or not, influence everyone’s moral thinking, but mostly it
is training, indoctrination, much of it subliminal, not education. Little of it is 
intellectually demanding; little aspires to upgrade capacities for moral understanding and 
deliberation. Of the pittance we spend on training our police (our paramilitary defenders 
against violent domestic threats), the least fraction goes toward training its managers 
(lieutenants, captains, chiefs), and the education of their character rarely approaches the 
perfunctory semester of professional ethics sometimes mandated at nongovernmental 
professional schools. Our community leaves the edification of moral character to its 
extra-governmental institutions and agencies, which do little to take up the slack. 
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Meanwhile, we build and comfortably equip three large Bachelor-of-Science 
granting schools for the Army, Navy and Air Force – and two smaller ones for the Coast 
Guard and Merchant Marine, which I’ll have less in mind.  We tax ourselves to pay for 
the plant, equipment, all operating expenses, the costs of labor (management, faculty, and
staff), and all the raw materials: the cadets and midshipmen who receive (tax free) 
schooling, food, shelter, amusements, miscellaneous amenities, and a stipend to boot. By 
a conservative accounting, we’re investing beyond a billion dollars per annum making 
that raw material into the managers of our means of killing masses of people.7 
What’s it all for? Not primarily to produce leaders equipped with exquisite 
technical expertise. Our federal military academies are unlike professional or trade 
schools for dentistry, computer programming, and the like. Cadets and midshipmen 
endure relentless, rigorous physical conditioning and mindless chores galore while their 
course content differs little from that for Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) 
students at civilian colleges, who are commissioned like academy graduates at a fraction 
of taxpayer expense. Most of the technical knowledge required for commissioning is 
transmitted as well in a dozen weeks of Officer Candidate School (OCS). As with police 
lieutenants and captains, a military officer’s expertise is acquired mostly post-
commissioning, on the job, in the “internship” and “residency” of junior officership, and 
subsequent training programs, war colleges and the like. 
The military trappings of America’s academies are mainly ambience, mimicked at
private military academies, high school and college. The martial programs and practices 
are mechanisms meant to mold character. The academies’ chartered mission, mandated by
Congress, is to produce, not military officers simpliciter, but specifically officers of high 
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moral character. Their graduates have inhabited 24/7 for 47 months a total institution 
(meant to be) calibrated for that mission. The closest counterparts to all this are some 
sect-supported seminaries and monasteries training intercessors with the higher powers. 
Our interests in the saintliness of our military leaders are more mundane. What are they?
One legitimate interest is self-protection. Any nation has reason to fear its military
turning against it. However low the likelihood here, the possibility has been realized too 
often in human history ever to be prudently ignored. A society’s armed forces are its de 
facto ultimate power with the might of brute physical domination and demolition. 
Whatever the laws and political structure, whatever the other operative forces in a 
society, ultimately its health and very existence are at the mercy of those commanding its 
military personnel and equipment. Nothing stands between their power and the 
usurpation or destruction of the state. More commonly, like a foreign army or fleet, a 
state’s military may, without seizing control of the state, be beyond its control and act 
with impunity in small matters or large. At minimum, as happens here, a nation’s military
is one of many competing centers of power, each prone to perceive its own interests as 
coincident with the nation’s interests and to distort the nation’s priorities accordingly. 
Against all these threats, a state’s last line of defense – its defense against its own defense
force – is the honor and humility of its military leaders.   
Also, and now more than ever, America is vulnerable to the moral failings of its 
military commanders, whose injustice, indifference, impatience or intolerance toward 
other peoples would secure us deep enmity and shame, shredding the last remnants of our
leadership and moral authority. Here self-interest commends what justice commands. 
We’d be derelict in our relations with other peoples if we made no effort to protect them 
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from the power we bestow on our officers, especially when we ramp up the frequency 
and intrusiveness of our officers’ roles in their lives. The moral training of our military 
leaders is a minimum gesture of respect for another people after exacting from them legal
immunity for crimes against them our service people might commit.
We have legitimate interests in the protection of our world from ourselves. Our 
defense policy has been intent on maintaining "full spectrum dominance”. Our 
unmatched military superiority is an inherently dangerous reality. We prefer to think of it 
as a force for peace and justice, but it cannot be that without being available as a force for
belligerence and injustice. We have too much power and too much pride in it and too 
little fear of its exercise. We desperately need devices to keep from unduly indulging in 
violence to have our way in the world. One such device is demanding that our officers get
some intellectually serious schooling in moral reasoning and understanding. As I told our 
ethics students: “This might seem a perilous, counter-productive policy, for such studies 
equip and encourage officers to consider the justice and justifiability of any armed 
conflict their nation orders them to wage, an this means they may question the 
justifiability of their obedience and service. Actually, it is a bulwark of a free, democratic 
society that its military leaders have an enlightened conscience. The more dominant our 
military becomes, the more significant this safeguard becomes for our nation and the 
world.”8 Only politicians bent on mischief could have anything to fear from empowering 
our military conscience with the analytical tools for evaluating its basic values and 
principles. Any attempt to abort this new mission of our service academies should be seen
as a sign that some despotism is in the works.
 Moral education of our military leaders serves much of our citizenry individually,
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as well as members of the collectivity. The nation entrusts its military officers with near 
absolute subordination of fellow adult citizens, a totalistic control not countenanced in 
the secular, civilian world outside our prisons. Military subordinates have the 
vulnerability of captives, for however voluntary their entrance into service, their options 
for exiting are minimal, costly and can be closed at the government’s pleasure. Also, 
military personnel lose most of the civilian employee recourse to the courts.
The control is massive, and so are the numbers controlled. Even at (relative) peace our 
armed forces are huge and their turnover is high. In war they may include any number of 
us, our friends and family. Nowhere else in a functioning democracy are so many legally 
competent, law-abiding citizens so much at the mercy of the moral sense of their 
superiors.
 A further way grooming our officers’ character serves the national interest is that 
their – and thus our – military success depends mightily on their character. Strong 
character is generally crucial for effective leadership in any field, and especially in the 
military, for warfare tests character like no other common human activity. The respect, 
trust, loyalty, and devotion of the troops depends on their perception of their leaders' 
character — as does the respect and trust of our allies and our enemies. The effectiveness 
of military operations depends on the former; the need for military operations on the 
latter. 
Evidence: When the academies hawk themselves to civilians holding the 
purse strings, they address our democracy, where everyone knows the political costs of a 
politician’s questioning the value of our officer corps being filled with fair minded, 
decent human beings we’d happily have as neighbors. When our elected purchasing 
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agents want to be resold on the whole academy enterprise, they want some justification 
for the immense extra expense of educating officers in the academies instead of ROTC, 
OCS and other possible paths of ascension.9
Academy advocates cannot convincingly claim that the products of other routes to
commissioning are not and cannot be as virtuous. I once informally polled USNA officers
of the highest ranks whether they would be able to identify an officer’s ascension path 
based solely on their sense of the individual’s character. None thought they could. 
Despite this, none wavered in his/her faith either in the academies as molders of character
or in themselves as judges of character. They may acknowledge their fallibility about the 
effects of specific programs and policies, but they resist conceding that, if enhancement 
of moral virtue is the aim, the whole academy experience could well be for naught. 
Faith in the efficacy of academy character education withers, I'm told, in JAGS 
after years prosecuting and defending transgressions by officers – committed at much the 
same rate whatever the commissioning history.  One senior military academy clinician 
privately opines that the academies’ principal effect on personality is infantilization due 
to lost independence and decreased range of responsibility. (Such regression soon enough
evaporates after graduation and assumption of “real world” responsibilities.) The 
anecdotal evidence is not encouraging. 
Neither is the only credible relevant research, the 2006 USMA review of a recent 
decade stretch of Army officer records of separation for misconduct sorted by sources of 
commission. The findings are not well known. Official announcements cherry pick the 
evidence. The probability of an unprodded publication of the raw data is not high. The 
numbers say that West Point graduates have somewhat better misconduct records than 
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officers from the non-collegiate OCS path, but not significantly better than officers from 
all other sources combined, and not at all better than the most comparable group, full 
scholarship ROTC. (Reluctance to release the research has been premised on statistical 
circumspection: the sample size, some 50,000 records, has been declared too small to be 
probative. Defenders of their own research have been dealt with predictably.)  
Despite discouraging data, faith in the academy system stays robust in some 
quarters. Perhaps faith in the efficacy of the military regimen as molder of moral 
character is akin to faith in the unique efficacy of capital punishment as a deterrent of 
crime, and of torture as an elicitor of information. Such beliefs are notoriously popular 
and powerful. They have been for ages before there was evidence that could explain and 
justify any certainty. Passionate certainty motivates searches for evidence to justify itself. 
People are certain because they want to feel certain because they need their world to be 
normatively ordered, a world they can make sense of, where things are as they should be, 
and doing good things, like respecting people, pays, especially when it’s deserved, and 
doing bad things to the bad people deserving it is necessary to get the best results. 
We live our lives and run our world on pet hunches. We’ve had little better to go 
on. Now things grow direr. Our common sense conception of character is being subjected
to unnerving critiques deriving from recent empirical and analytical studies.10  We’re 
getting better and better reasons to worry that we are all far more clueless or flat out 
mistaken about these matters than we dare imagine. Currently, while faith in the 
academies as moral character factories might not be wholly misplaced, confidence in that 
costly system is not warranted by any facsimile of scientifically respectable evidence.
The academies are to be commended for recently recognizing this, and taking the 
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first baby steps toward remedying it. Are they prepared to recognize the magnitude of the 
task they’ve set themselves? Are they willing to commit themselves to pursue seriously 
the creation of intellectually respectable measures of character? The task is tantamount to 
a Manhattan Project in psychology and ethics -- and in this case it’s not unlikely that the 
military may learn lots it doesn’t want to hear -- so optimism for the near term looks 
ludicrous.
My own native pessimism was reinforced during my last act as ethics advisor 
dissuading the USNA leadership from committing to a perfectly preposterous “character 
assessment measure” promoted by a three-year special subcommittee (2/3 clueless how to
evaluate any such animal, but pressed by an impatient Superintendent for results). Sparks 
of optimism survive when the High Command listens to reason. Despair settles in when 
the organizational mindset hampers its mission. Despite – or because of – all the mind-
numbing encomia of character, military minds seem to suffer some diminished capacity 
for grasping the challenges of the epistemology of character assessment.11
Though obvious, it is too rarely noted that the difficulties of measuring character 
and its development differ considerably, in degree and kind, depending on the trait. To 
take a pointed instance, when assessing the utility of officers studying moral reasoning, in
the academies or elsewhere, the first question must be what traits it is likely to influence. 
Having Marines muddle through moral theories is often abruptly dismissed as worthless, 
patently irrelevant to the military’s mission. All bridges from such refined cerebration to 
enhanced vaunted military virtues (courage, discipline, loyalty, honor, integrity, 
selflessness, perseverance) are all too rickety. The payoff of a proper intro ethics course is
looked for in the wrong places.
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Evidently, the disvaluation of instruction in moral reasoning betokens the 
disvaluation, endemic in the military, of humility. The benefits of participation in well 
regulated Socratic battles, though less regular than the effects of sunshine on seeds, are 
frequent and manifest. Competent ethics instructors live on the common, dramatic 
occasions when it comes as a revelation to some students that their moral beliefs are not 
mere opinions invulnerable to all contradiction, that they are subject to and at the mercy 
of reasoning that literally compels assent or at least respect, and that their embarrassment 
by a compelling argument opposing their beliefs is only compounded by dismissively 
declaring, “Well, that’s just your opinion”. Retreat to that redoubt is not an option, not 
when the argument’s premises match your own beliefs, and its inferences run the same 
rails as your own rationality. The longer you brazenly resist, the more humbling the 
surrender when you’ve spent your last clip. Experiencing that a time or two tends to leave
lasting, measurable effects on a person’s openness to other people’s “opinions”. 12 
Another testable benefit: education in moral reasoning enhances skills leaders 
need for explaining the reasonableness of their decisions to superiors, peers and 
subordinates, and therewith securing the respect, trust and confidence requisite for 
effective leadership.13
Some military leaders display such skills and propensities. They are open to the 
idea of a character assessment project. They see that they command an unmatched 
laboratory for longitudinal studies, from academy to retirement. The potential boon for 
civilian society doesn’t excite them. Their conception of the profit for the military is 
inchoate so their enthusiasm is tempered. Presently they seem ambivalent, less from 
skepticism of success, and more from a reluctance to recognize fully that without an 
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answer to the question of how to measure character, reason can never control practice or 
be truly practical. Without a reliable measure of results, talk of ends and means is idle 
uplift.
ROI: Despite an undistinguished record for instilling righteousness, no 
service chief dare abandon the academies and alienate their proud alumni, who dominate 
the senior staff and top ranks throughout the services. The academies’ official raison 
d’etre has resided in that very circumstance. The academy superintendents’ favorite 
power-pointed apologia is that academy graduates tend to stay in service longer than 
officers of other ascensions, and fill the highest ranks at a greater rate. The higher the 
rank, the higher the percent of academy alumni. Officer retention rates constantly 
fluctuate for all kinds of reasons, but the academies’ relative success remains the highest. 
Amortize the training investment over a career and the academies appear to have a 
comfortably high Return on Investment (ROI). Or so it is said.
The superintendents’ case for cost-effectiveness had better be good. The 
academies would be extravagant failures if they produced first-rate ensigns and 
lieutenants without thereby producing first-rate career officers serving 20-30 years and 
becoming captains, admirals, colonels or generals. Recent analyses of the data suggest 
that the superintendents' case is getting steadily less compelling, so it now convinces few 
but the converted.14 
Obviously, whatever the raw numbers regarding retention and rank, their 
explanation must recognize diverse factors. One such is self-selection. Those willing to 
serve a short term to finance a college education and not needing a total subsidy might 
see ROTC as the best deal, while someone eager for or open to a military career may be 
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more amenable to the rigors and privations of academy life. Also, old boy networks are 
unlikely to have a lesser role in the military than elsewhere. And more than likely the 
politics of retention and promotion is aggravated by our military’s policy of requiring 
steady promotion for retention. (One officer, upon becoming a Navy Captain, was 
counseled by his superior: “This is the last promotion you’ll receive based on merit.” 
Readers will have their own hunches how much of that is dismissible exaggeration 
betraying disgruntlement.)15
All the statistical niceties of ROI analysis may be a sideshow. No analysis can be 
politically decisive when so many intangibles merit consideration and the prospects for 
agreement on a metric are so grim. Anyway, whether or not it’s factored into the ROI, one
consideration will swamp all others. Grant the high likelihood that ROTC and OCS and 
other options could be sufficiently developed to produce all the needed fully proficient 
officers. We’ll never really know since it is not going to happen. Until all the world’s 
lions lie with its lambs, we are not going to suffer a national trauma of losing the 
academies, and work thru a shaky time regaining our level of confidence in our officers 
and our whole military. 
I sense that many Americans -- and foreigners too --would feel threatened by 
shuttering the academies: it would assault the national and international certainty of the 
professionalism of this military. The prestige of those schools is self-perpetuating. What 
we want from our military (and our police) is security. What we want even more is a 
feeling of security. We want to be feeling comforted when we think about our military.  
Our nation justifiably enjoys its confidence in its professionalized military. We don’t 
much doubt that ROTC and OCS grads are sufficiently competent, but, in my experience,
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even the proud ROTC and OCS grads commonly share the civilians’ sense that the 
academies are the true font of our military’s professionalism. If we knew how to price 
America’s – and its allies’ and enemies’ -- confidence in this military’s professionalism 
we might conclude that at a billion a year the academies are a bargain.16
Commitment: Whatever their success, the intent of the academies is 
explicit. The official "purpose" of USNA: To provide the Naval Service with leaders of 
character who will serve the nation in peace and war. Its stated "mission": To provide 
graduates who are dedicated to a career of naval service…. The Navy’s “core values” 
make it emphatic: Honor, Courage, Commitment. Each service branch and academy has 
its own motto, mission statement, core values, or the like, but every item is saluted at all. 
In response to the precipitous drop in officer retention in previous decades, the West 
Point mission statement was revised last decade by its new Superintendent to further 
emphasize this goal: “to educate, train, and inspire the corps of cadets for a career as an 
officer in the United States Army.” 
What the nation wants from these schools sits oddly with what the students want. 
Students aren’t being enticed by intimations that their peculiar post-secondary education 
will induce an abiding penchant to remain till pension time in the military. I have yet to 
meet any midshipmen (current or graduate) who say they welcomed the privations of 
their undergraduate years in the hope that this route to a commission would secure them a
perduring proclivity for military life. Predictably, their motivations are all over the map. 
Some come with career uncertainties and hopes that they’ll like the regimen well enough 
to be more settled of mind. Some don’t come that way, but come away glad the academy 
had that effect. Many come with clenched intent to be a careerist, with no need for the 
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academy to encourage the ambition, other than not discouraging it. They’d head for 
ROTC or OCS if the academies hadn’t picked them – or didn’t exist. Taxpayers might 
wonder whether their money is wasted on them.
Tax dollars may seem more misspent on the many midshipmen and cadets who 
come with no inclination to pursue a military career, and never share the nation’s goals 
for their academy attendance. No such motivation is required of them. No commitment to
service is made until the third year, and a mere 5-year obligation may suffice. No 
disposition for dedication to the service is demanded for academy admission or 
commissioning.  The services dare not do more than encourage career ambitions for fear 
of losing too many of the most promising candidates. Among our best and brightest, there
is no surplus of interest in a military career – and we dare not let any but our best and 
brightest command so much power.
The academies continue to attract a comfortably high caliber of students. The 
minimum physical requirements are unthinkable at any other college. Academy entrants 
are the swiftest and strongest, the most physically fit and athletic of any freshmen class 
and the differential grows over four years. They are hardly just jocks. No school 
admissions process more stringently scrutinizes applicant character. However crude our 
indicia of character, it's a safe bet that academy students on average have more strength 
of character and altruism than any other student body. So while they don't rank highest 
for pure intellect (average SAT’s 1300-1350), among all the able-bodied, earnest and 
decent young men and women in our land, they are an exceptionally bright lot. 17
Demanding more passion for service from prospective (or actual) officers would 
be pointless and counterproductive. An adequate devotion to duty need not be a love of 
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duty, a yearning for its continuance. Absent a surplus of credible candidates, efficiency 
prefers aptitude over proclivity. Wasting some dollars training gifted prospects who'll 
never want a career from it costs less than settling for ambitious second-rate talent. 
Demanding career commitment is impracticable. Encouraging it is necessary and 
unobjectionable, within limits,
Glorification: The military’s self-valorization is among the more audible and 
visible contrasts between professionalism in the military and elsewhere. Our military’s 
exaltation of a military career and glorification of warriors and particularly their 
commanders are deliberately beyond what other professions would dare. (The 
deliberateness is manifested in exaltations of such exaltation, praising the praising, 
honoring the honoring.) A service career is valued as noble, and so are the aspiration and 
dedication to it. Any honest workman regards his work as honorable, in the minimal 
sense of being respectable, not dishonorable. The warrior ethos aggressively glorifies 
warrior work, regarding it honorable in the most robust sense of being a noble calling, 
worthy of honoring with the highest honors of the nation - a nation grateful for its men 
and women willing to risk limb and life, saving it from oppression, or conquering others, 
winning wealth, power, and glory for the whole nation. No other profession is more 
celebrated or bears such an exalted self-conception. The most estimable of dentists, 
teachers, accountants and attorneys get no ticker tape parade, and don’t dream of 
professional exploits deserving one. 
Professionalism elsewhere does not urge practitioners to bethink themselves a 
breed apart. The best respected doctors and teachers get off the pedestals their clients 
keep putting under their feet. They create a human relationship fit for open, honest 
266
communication. Here the consistency of the military ethos with our civic culture gets 
strained. 
Our civilian-military relations are notoriously subject to tensions, mutual 
suspicions, and sharp conflicts of values and ideals. The strains can have diverse sources. 
The military’s legal and political subordination entails some kind of respect for the basic 
principles and values of the civic culture it serves, but the mission it is assigned drives it 
to develop and enforce a profoundly different ethos that proudly promotes pride in itself, 
its values and standards. There are real sources of real oppositions, and real obstacles to 
mutual comprehension. Conflicts are commonly misconceived in counter-productive 
terms of military versus civilian when actually the alleged disagreements may appear 
within one or both sides as well as between them. Both sides can be victims of 
stereotypes of their opponents and themselves by supposing that some belief or attitude is
an essential fixture of a perspective when actually military professionalism is not 
committed to that belief or attitude, and civilian culture is not committed to its opposite. 
Some military professionals insist that the military conceive itself as subject to “higher” 
standards than civilians, a conception suggesting some competition and moral superiority 
that some civilians think ominous and arrogant -- and some military professionals 
deride.18 
The ROI on our military and civilian practices of glorification of military service 
and of commitment and dedication to that service must certainly be huge. We’d be 
radically confounded – we could not know what to believe about human motivation -- if 
we somehow discovered that all of our cheering has no tendency to raise the likelihood 
that some of us will be willing to have their brains blown out just so the rest of us remain 
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brained.  
But, stopping there aborts the ROI. No human activity is totally riskless and 
costless. Yet an ROI “measurement” of the risks and costs of all our glorification of 
military service now sounds near oxymoronic. We are profoundly fractionated in our 
attitudes about the military and its glorification. Many civilians feel certain that a 
republican liberal culture is imperiled by the glorification of the warrior typical of other 
cultures. (Never mind that the certainty certainly exceeds anyone’s ability to specify the 
kinds and degrees of excessive glorification and consequent kinds of costs and benefits 
and persuasively measure them and the risks.) While measurement is beyond us, it still 
seems reasonable to worry whether our indiscriminate honoring of devotion to dubious 
purposes carries more terrible risks and costs than we’re willing to admit. 
Just what social status of the military is consistent with the evolving liberal 
egalitarianism of our democratic tradition is up for grabs. This whole subject is made 
more puzzling, and maybe paradoxical, because we cannot evaluate our activity of 
evaluating and glorifying the military in ROI terms alone. We are not really glorifying if 
we are doing so only because of a belief in its utility. The glorifiers must and do suppose 
that the service, and dedication, and glorifying have some significant value apart from 
keeping them safer. What could that value be?
It seems to be an intrinsic value in one respect: Its value seems independent of 
any effect on the quality of job performance. Many of the most dedicated may be 
incompetent, while others who wish they were elsewhere may perform impeccably. Yet, 
dedication is not an unconditional good. Its value varies with the value of its object. And 
also with the person’s motivations and character. Dedication to the US Marine Corps may
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be an admirable trait when possessed by someone of good character. In the lives of the 
vicious and brutal there may be nothing in their dedication to esteem or respect. The 
dedication is unworthy of encouragement unless subordinate to a dedication to serving 
one's country, a commitment to substantial selflessness for the sake of one's own people, 
or the like. There’s reason to doubt that a military organization can be in itself a 
legitimating object of dedication that makes dedication to it commendable apart from a 
dedication to some intrinsic good.19 
Presumably the glorification of military service is due to the basic, supreme value 
it serves along with the great risks and costs of the service. All that transfers to the 
glorification of dedication to the service. Professionals generally respect dedication to 
their profession; their glorifications of it are low key. Our military’s need of it is like no 
other. The job of a standing armed force is to stay on the job. Its job to secure our safety, 
now , next Tuesday, and perpetually. That is not the performance of some action like a 
surgical operation or a lecture. We want a standing army to just stand there and stay put. 
Their job is to be dedicated. 
Our civic culture’s core values are threatened when our glorification of the 
military suggests some disparagement of dedication to other forms of community service.
And while some amongst us might wish it otherwise, our nation cannot officially 
stigmatize a life lacking any such dedication, a life markedly more spontaneous. Such 
lives may be lived badly and wasted, as may lives of unflagging dedication. A nation may
properly encourage a longing to serve it with a lifetime in the military. It may honor the 
service and the longing, but our best traditions don’t derogate citizens devoid of any wish
for membership in the nation’s military. No eagerness for such service is necessary for 
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being a good citizen. Suffice that citizens be willing to serve when the nation needs them.
Society and its state may wish to encourage more, but penalizing its lack is antithetical to 
the individualism this nation prizes.
A deficiency or absence of dedication is not readily regarded a vice. Dedication is 
not perseverance, a trait whose potential for contribution to job performance is evident, 
and whose absence can be costly. Motivations like dedication and pride don’t improve 
job performance like other virtues. It’s rather that pride motivates the production of its 
justification; ambitions and aspirations are themselves means to their own attainment. 
Yet, again, the drive to have a distinguished career does not strictly correlate with 
success. When job performance is faultless, faulting someone’s dedicational deficiencies 
seems senseless, and perhaps self-defeating. And when the absence of a trait is not 
regarded a vice, regarding the trait as a virtue is subject to instabilities.
Propaganda?: The academies are tasked with commissioning a high rate 
of their Plebes, and thus with nurturing and fostering a passion for commitment and 
dedication to military service. Elsewhere, conceptions of respect set some limits to the 
methods and means of persuasion. So there’s room for worry whether and when the 
academies’ control over the informational environment may fail to fully respect the 
autonomy of the students making life choices.
Armed combat calls for extreme selflessness, a willingness to die for comrades 
and countrymen. The academies need and want to nurture this. They call upon students 
by appealing to their love of country, loyalty to their mates, sense of duty, their personal 
honor and other selfless springs of virtue to motivate conduct endangering the self. Yet, 
students willing to shed their life’s blood in the line of duty can get resentful and 
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rebellious when made to sacrifice some hours to the gnawing boredom of the ceaseless, 
omnipresent character training they’re subjected to. To pleas that they selflessly submit 
themselves to hours of torment listening to prattling about the beauty of selflessness they 
might listen obediently, but incredulously. Instead they are told to value this training for 
its contribution to their character development. In turn, the character development is to be
valued for its contribution to their career. 
Students swim in a steady stream of stories of the utility of virtue for victory and 
career advancement. They are taught the 1001 ways that leaders and mangers benefit by 
respecting subordinates. The constant refrain (rarely sung by philosophically trained 
faculty, military or civilian) is that success as officers and leaders comes from character, 
particularly integrity, the pole star of a constellation of moral virtues validating trust and 
vindicating obedience. Moral virtues (and the training developing them) are valued for 
their contributions to an officer’s proficiency, and thus to professional success; their 
contribution to the military’s proficiency is assumed, but left in the background.  
 That sales pitch is popular -- echoed at business schools and elsewhere -- and, not 
coincidentally, simplistic. It is so pervasive even among leaders who better know better 
as to merit a few paragraph excursus into the heart of daylight.
In the absence of any objective, operational measures of character, its correlations 
with anything else are moot. Currently our evidence is a rag bag of anecdotes. On that 
basis, while the moral virtues of military leaders appear to frequently and importantly 
affect their professional success, only blind or bad faith would infer that nice leaders 
always finish first and nasty ones last.  Elsewhere sometimes a John Wooden wins; 
sometimes a Bobby Knight; sometimes a Leonard Bernstein leads his troops to musical 
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success; other times Toscanini-like tyrants triumph. Bradleys, Marshalls and like models 
of military rectitude reap victories and honors, and so do monsters of horrific cruelty 
toward the enemy or subordinates or anyone in their path. 
The ancient idea that virtue is essential for happiness has some truth, but it is not 
that a leader deficient in moral rectitude must be disadvantaged in mortal combat. 
Common sense says that different leaders succeed in different circumstances. In some, 
good character is a great asset; in others, priceless. But, sometimes vices are assets. 
Vanity has its costs, and is specially liable to be lethal in the military, yet the rank, 
renown, and charisma of a Patton or MacArthur are often more consequences of vanity 
than causes of it. (Vanity amongst the cleverest philosophers is no less endemic.) 
The virtue-success equation must be complex, varying with the virtue and the 
circumstances. Physical courage is called for and displayed on the front lines; valor is 
less tested in senior strategists continents away from the fray today. Circumstances call 
on specific virtues, and virtues call for specific rewards: compassion and cooperativeness 
don’t occasion the same awe and respect as bravery or garner the most coveted medals. A 
virtue’s rewards have variant contingencies; the risks run vary with the vice. The tests of 
integrity, courage, truthfulness, and loyalty are relatively uncontroversial once the bare 
empirical facts are known, while the tests of justice are liable to more variant 
interpretations and evaluations, so the just man’s rewards are more subject to luck. 
Academy catechism says that integrity is the key virtue of military executives: their 
leadership rests on it, so the organization must value it, and tend to reward it. The same 
cannot be said about justice, not as confidently and convincingly. Accordingly, though not
denied, it is less said at the academies. The trouble is: integrity without justice may win 
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honors and admiration while its ethical value is suspect or nil.
 When what we really care about is simply victory, a success specified without 
moral notions, the officers and traits we promote come with all kinds of vices. Where and
how ethical virtues have a role in professional success depends mainly on how much we 
really admire the nobility of those traits, not just their utility, and how well we secure 
their utility by institutional and cultural constraints, incentives and sanctions. 
Often the best sanctions seem natural by being effects of extra-institutional norms 
or rules adopted for other reasons. Leadership by instilling respect and trust rather than 
raw fear may meet more success when the troops come from an egalitarian culture 
inhospitable to servility. Also, forswearing conscription encourages an institutional 
culture valorizing ethical leadership. Moral concern for the welfare of subordinates may 
wane when their service is voluntary, but political pressure waxes, for the ranks must be 
filled. When service jobs compete in a free market of employment, enlistment and 
reenlistment are jeopardized by maltreatment of subordinates. This is among the best, if 
less cited, reasons for all-volunteer armed forces.20 Another is that abjuring conscription 
may brake resorts to military force to attain a nation’s ends.21 Among the most heinous 
and resented mistreatments of subordinates is commanding them to use violence against 
other people for an unworthy or dubious cause. (The ever popular idea that universal 
conscription would make America more pacific defies history and horse sense.) Here and 
elsewhere the reward rate for virtue reflects the fairness of background conditions. 
Any post-adolescent who denies such patent truisms risks being suspected of 
dishonesty by many mature adults. Science suggests an alternative hypothesis. 
Anthropology tells us that notions of immanent justice structure primitive people's 
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perception of reality. Piagetian developmental research adds that infantile convictions of 
the regularity of virtue’s worldly success commonly persist and permeate the thinking of 
well-educated young adults.  It does seem that, despite all their professed cynicism, 
cadets and midshipmen generally profess or betray some such simple faith in a straight 
line dependence of effective officership on good character. Many return to preach the 
word to later classes with evident conviction.
Perhaps faith in the perfect utility of virtue is a necessary ladder, best thrown 
away later. Evidence of damage done by this conviction tends to be equivocal. Still, 
insofar as PMEE is owned and operated by officers whose conception of its mission 
relevance is predicated on this juvenile hope, some anxieties about PMEE’s intellectual 
and moral integrity might be appropriate. There are at least two causes of concern here.
First, trust in the academies’ honesty is tested by moralizing that tends to pretend 
that the sanctions for moral failings are natural and inevitable, when that is rarely true 
anywhere and less so in the military, where formal and informal norms of secrecy and 
loyalty present formidable obstacles to the exposure of wrongdoing and effective 
enforcement. What’s inevitable is that the virtue-reward relation in the military is prone 
to perversion by politics and public relations. Academy moralizing is mocked by the 
reality of pervasive hypocrisy -- by Pentagon and political leaders’ fabricating a heroic 
death for Cpl. Pat Tillman, and doing nothing (or damn little) to discourage the media 
glorification of the misadventures of Pfc. Jessica Lynch, while still doing near nothing to 
encourage the national recognition and glorification due the awesome, humbling heroism 
of CWO Hugh Thompson at My Lai. Add on to this our nation's doing near nothing to 
dishonor and punish “our boys” who commit military atrocities (e.g., bombing civilian 
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water facilities and disabled enemy soldiers) while screaming “war crime” at the least 
infraction by any enemy (e.g., broadcasting POW photos.) Compounding it further, the 
enemy war criminals we go after are, rightly, the leadership, while our own war criminals
we prosecute (successfully or at all) are the lowest ranked involved. All this makes an 
exquisite recipe nourishing cynicism or self-deception.
The academies’ treatment of such matters is nearly as discouraging as it is 
encouraging – and it is stupendously encouraging. Our academies deserve to be publicly 
honored and glorified for honoring and glorifying Hugh Thompson, and requiring its 
future officer to contemplate the horror of My Lai – and commanding a gunship to kill 
the next fellow American who tries adding to the horror. The academies are among the 
rare places in this military and this nation where Thompson gets some bits of his due 
recognition; this is one of the many ways the moral tenor of the academies surpasses the 
rest of the military culture and our public culture. But, this denial of Thompson’s due 
elsewhere is not dwelt upon at the academies. The institutional moral courage gets 
strained when talk turns to the treatment our government and our military have given to 
members of our military whose conduct causes them some embarrassment. Students are 
not much made to ponder Thompson’s fate at the hands of Congress, the DoD and down 
the line – or the fate of the officers responsible for the massacre. Students are not 
discouraged from it, but neither are they encouraged to consider the incidents and 
patterns of injustice by politicians, Pentagon, and public, befalling our blackest sheep, 
and whistleblowers and moral heroes who embarrass our nation and its military. However
understandable and justifiable, it is dispiriting to observe a pattern of avoiding full 
discussion of the dispiriting realities of the career to which these students are to commit 
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themselves.
Character: The other worry about all the attention on the profits of virtue is a 
worry about the operative morality of military professionalism. If we are aiming to 
nurture moral virtue, do we need to inculcate a faith that we make our fighting forces 
more effective by denying their managers the option of flogging insubordinate 
subordinates? Shouldn’t our leaders-to-be instead be learning to be willing to accept the 
consequences of abjuring cruelty and callousness? Shouldn’t the “take away” be that 
brutality is not a legitimate leadership style, however effective?22 
Absolutely. And not necessarily. There’s no impropriety in our military 
impressing upon its future leaders that respecting subordinates is necessary for their 
respecting the leader. There’s no impropriety in a leader being moved to be respectful by 
the fact of its utility. But, first, what that motivates is only the respect necessary to 
receive the respect necessary for mission accomplishment. Determining the bounds of the
respect thus required is beyond the capacity of current social science. And, second, 
implicit in that, it matters mightily what motivational system that reason fits into and 
where,
Most people are moved by much the same reasons. We differ mainly in the 
ordering and prioritizing of our motives. Military professionalism may root itself in some 
contractualist self-conception premised on equal respect and mutual consent to impose a 
maximization of military proficiency where necessary for survival. Where and how 
respect constrains maximization is debatable. Instead, a military professional might be a 
Sidgwickian esoteric rule consequentialist whose secret deepest principle is military 
proficiency maximization, which motivates an organization to institutionalize a public 
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morality in which respect constrains the maximizing principle -- but is constrained by the 
deeper principle when pushed to the wall. And, if the empirical assumptions are right, 
another military professional might be an egoist officer who profits by running his life 
according to any of the above possibilities. 
These contrasting structures of principles and reasons may come to similar 
judgments about specific actions, but the character of persons depends profoundly on the 
structuring of their motivations, and the content of their most basic reasons and dominant 
principles.
The character of military professionalism is most fully expressed in the character 
PMEE promotes. The character the academies aspire to inspire is more specific and 
peculiar than a set of ethical virtues we all have reason to want in any fellow member of 
our community. Even coupled with technical proficiency, the moral virtues of a decent 
human being don't suffice for competence, let alone excellence, as a military leader. In 
the military, some traits like hardiness become vital; for leaders, still other traits like 
decisiveness are crucial. The distinctively military virtues include higher degrees of 
toughness (physical and emotional), self-confidence, and earnestness. The toughness 
risks running to callousness, the self-confidence is liable to arrogant imperiousness, and 
the earnestness is a susceptibility to sanctimoniousness. (A ready sense of absurdity is an 
asset in military life, but is not officially classified a virtue.)  
Yet, again, our military ethos is supposed to be consistent with our civic culture 
and to depart from it only in its context-appropriate accentuations. The character of 
modern professionals is, I take it, a compromise, wherein distinctively military traits are 
to be substantially constrained by a civilian enlightenment ethos – in evolving ways and 
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degrees. Finding the right balance is challenging. Our prized virtues, traits and ideals can 
collide.
Discipline: USNA declares that its mission must “… imbue [academy 
students] with the highest ideals of duty, honor and loyalty.” Actually, not every ideal of 
duty, honor and loyalty inspires a dedication to military service. The ethos the academies 
aim to instill (what the military considers “the highest ideals”) is supposed to inspire such
dedication. An ethos is more than universal ethical principles and values. 
USNA further specifies its mission to be: To inspire and develop outstanding 
young men and women to become … officers with knowledge, character, and discipline. 
Discipline is itself a character trait. This double counting of discipline expresses the 
military’s distinctive conception of the best character. 
“Discipline” is a noun naming a trait presumed to be developed by an activity 
named by the verb. Civilians value the trait as a form of self-control, a capacity for 
staying focused, unfazed by distractions, impervious to impulse. The military values that 
too, but its emphasis has long been on fixed habits of obedience and the automaticity of 
compliance with commands.
The name of the activity developing the trait is sometimes synonymous with 
‘punish’. The activity is normally impermissible unless performed by someone entitled to
control its object. It is a stern regimen difficult to maintain outside a closely controlled 
environment. All of the distinctive features of the whole military regimen, and thus the 
whole academy regimen appear to be premised on the assumption that the primary trait, 
throughout the troops, essential for military proficiency, that the military can much 
control, is discipline. The prioritization of discipline is the academy’s fundamental 
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contrast with civilian colleges. 
The regimen has long been liable to influences by the military value of other traits
(especially loyalty), but any reform imperiling discipline is suspect. The recent relaxation
of the regime may indicate that the trait is now less valued, its value less absolutely 
dominant. It may indicate instead or in addition a reconception of that trait.
The academies tout their regimen as contributing to an officer’s character, not just
the trait of discipline, but the whole complex of desired character traits: justice, honesty, 
integrity, etc. Upon reflection, this seems prima facie implausible.  I suggest that they 
have inherited an honored traditional regimen well-enough designed to maximize 
discipline, with a well-enough documented record of success. They must promote other 
traits contributing to military proficiency, but just how this regimen would further the 
development of most moral virtues is a mystery, while the potential for retarding the 
development of some prized traits seems evident.
The newly softened regimen may increase the proficiency of the resulting 
discipline, but however softened it is a form of behavioral conditioning designed to effect
a reflexive response to a stimulus. Discipline is not conscientiousness, a disposition to be 
moved by the call of duty. Discipline responds directly to a command; the sacredness of 
duty is out of sight.  This disposition is unlike the propensities we commonly consider 
moral virtues, and the differences seem morally significant. Paradigm moral virtues like 
justice, honesty, self-control and courage seem to be dispositions regulated by some kind 
of practical wisdom which finely adjusts behavior to respond to situational variables 
affecting the contextual significance of specific actions. 
The hey-day of Skinnerian behaviorism is long past. The extravagance of its 
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claims of the pedagogical powers of behavioral conditioning is widely recognized. If 
there be a causal chain from the blunt conditioning to the fine modulations of a moral 
virtue, the links remain opaque or invisible. 
The military wants to avoid instilling habits imperiling military proficiency --like 
compliance with commands so automatic that the agent is incapable of intelligently 
responding to an evident catastrophe. The fine-tuning of discipline to get just the right 
balance of situationally appropriate automaticity and situationally appropriate 
circumspection has yet to be mastered by our learning theories. The possibilities for 
collisions of competing dispositions here are not remote hypotheticals. And the problems 
of installing the right dispositions are compounded by our pervasive disagreements in 
particular cases as to just which conduct is proper, optimal or acceptable. Those 
disagreements are nowhere more prevalent than in the contexts of questioning the 
propriety of questioning authority. 
Liberation: The academies evidence an admirable interest in promoting 
liberated thought -- up to a point. The academies make efforts to avoid producing “good 
Prussian soldiers” who robotically render unthinking obedience. They want officers to be 
thoughtful followers because they want thoughtful leaders, capable of independent, 
critical judgment.
There is authentic concern that what is billed as a philosophy course toward a 
baccalaureate degree not be a bully pulpit for indoctrination into the conventional code: 
“the Navy (Army/Air Force) way”. Rather than teaching the right answers and testing for 
recall, the intent is to improve the students’ powers of thoughtfulness, and perhaps their 
propensity for thoughtfulness of some intellectual sophistication. They teach future 
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leaders to listen with some open-mindedness to dissenting opinions of subordinates, and 
to question authority – when appropriate. They don’t want officers who park their 
conscience when they don a uniform. They have students study M. L. King's "Letter from
a Birmingham Jail” advocating civil disobedience. They teach that obedience to an illegal
order is itself illegal, and that an officer retains the ultimate moral responsibility for 
his/her obeying an immoral order, and that refusal to obey may be morally appropriate or 
required. 
The motivation for liberating thought is, of course, to improve military 
proficiency. The academies teach that training for proficiency at routine procedures is 
insufficient preparation for officers, and that rigidly authoritarian systems risk suffering 
significant and sometimes calamitous inefficiencies. That rationale is fine as far as it 
goes, but it stands alone, unchecked, and that is consequential because teaching pious 
platitudes takes no thought or courage. The devil is in the details of what, when, how 
much questioning is appropriate or allowable, and whether refusal of an order is required.
Such matters tend to be controversial. The military settles such controversies by 
considerations of military proficiency.
The wisdom of the new enlightened leadership style is readily illustrated with 
stories of superiors operating with misconceptions of plain fact or disregard of black 
letter law. The wisdom of welcoming a subordinate’s questioning one’s values or basic 
principles may be less obvious. That practice is less warmly recommended. 
What is recommended and practiced is a standing presumption, for factual and 
value judgments alike, that a superior's decision is to be trusted and acted upon. With all 
the bold extolling of independence of thought, in practice officers bethink themselves 
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required to presume that their superiors (civilian and military) work with the best 
information available and would not be deliberately commanding anything illegal or 
immoral. Some such presumption could be sound. It becomes willful naiveté when (as 
happens even at the highest ranks) the presumption is rendered indefeasible via such 
popular supplementary suppositions as that the leadership must have classified 
information justifying decisions and policies which appear unwise, unjust or irresponsible
by unprejudiced study of public information. 
Such supporting presumptions may be made more palatable by weakening the 
claim of infallibility and necessity (‘they must know’), and acknowledging the real 
possibility of competing, unflattering explanations of a leader's decision. The epistemic 
grounds for such acknowledgment are conceded. There’s no scandal in teaching that 
soldiers and sailors have done some horrible things following orders of their military or 
civilian leaders. Many academy instructors (more frequently but far from exclusively 
civilians) would admit that the ratio of righteous warring by this or any powerful 
democracy is not encouraging: it is not patently better than the ratio of right choices by 
leaders in other domains, where professionals don’t encourage habits of blinkered 
confidence in their leadership. Midshipmen are warned against indulging themselves in 
delusional patriotism. They read the wisdom of Admiral James Stockdale, wrought from 
brutal experience, that POW's nurtured on patriotic myth are especially vulnerable to 
being turned by being disabused of their historical naiveté.
So much for their sense of the past. Understandably, academy leaders do not 
invite the inductive leap to the present. They have seemed unprepared and unwilling to 
openly grapple with the issues of the integrity of PMEE at a national military academy 
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under a regime acting with evident contempt for the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in
bello taught in their military ethics textbooks. When coupled with the regime’s evident 
contempt for its highest commanders, PMEE can become mission impossible.
I know more than a few academy officers and instructors privately disapproved of
our invasion of Iraq in various ways and degrees. They were outraged or exasperated or 
depressed -- and that was before being shamed, agonized by obscene prison 
interrogations by the Army they had dedicated their lives to.Even among those 
sympathetic with the Bush Crusade (before learning of the intelligence fiasco or fraud) 
their bellicosity hadn't the politicos' enthusiastic pitch. Overall, whether for the invasion 
or against, their responses to 9-11 were markedly more tempered and measured -- enough
so that I began ruing the civilian control over our military, an attitude I’d never have 
imagined my ever entertaining.
However, the faculty’s mature, educated misgivings were not as freely or 
forcefully aired as at secular civilian colleges and universities, and at most all but our 
more dogmatic religious schools. That was hardly because their worries could go without 
saying. Not when, in the commons room of the USNA Professional Development 
Division (housing the Department of Leadership, Ethics and Law), the TV stayed tuned 
to a rabid FOX News. And not when the students, whose acculturation is a work in 
progress, are far more prone to whoop it up with the politicians and the revenge-ridden 
public they come from. 
The most depressing and hopeful moment of my academy stay was a Western Lit 
class in March, 2003 diverted to responding to earnest student requests to help them 
comprehend how any reasonable, decent American could possibly oppose our up-coming 
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invasion of Iraq. The hopeful part is that their incomprehension of so many of their 
countrymen really worried them. These future military leaders are teachable, reachable, 
and more open to rigorous independent reasoning than prevalent stereotypes predict. In 
one USMA military ethics class I’ve heard of, 80% of the papers argued, unprompted, 
that our Iraq invasion violated jus ad bellum principles.
Yet, informed public debate on any issue of such intense, immediate concern is, if 
not quite censored, not encouraged, as doubtless it will be when the issues are safely past 
and innocuously academic. Frank conversations with USNA leaders disclosed 
unembarrassed fears that serious debate on issues touching the students’ current or likely 
imminent decisions might end in “bad” choices.
That attitude is alien to other secular colleges and professional schools. There, 
such an occasion, when students are primed by intense personal involvement to dig deep 
into questions of immense complexity would likely be greeted as a supreme “teachable 
moment”. When better to fully engage students intellectually, emotionally, morally, as 
whole persons? At intellectually serious schools, an instructor, however confident in 
his/her own convictions, is pedagogically obliged to challenge students to wrestle with 
responsible opposed ideas. And after all, when it comes to moral education and character 
development, what point could there be to a study of principles and the past if it is not to 
be brought to bear on a student’s own present decisions?
But then, other schools do not have a comparable investment in their students. 
They do not run any comparable risk of losing it all in a single decision that defeats the 
institution’s essential mission and its responsibilities to the citizenry. Other school 
administrators are not nearly so properly susceptible to paternalism. Given the totality 
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and intimacy of academy leadership control over the lives of people they care about, 
staying their natural parental dispositions is an act of heroism.
Academy ethics education programs could not blithely ignore the 800 lb. gorilla 
looming over their shoulders. Thanks to its compliant military, the government had 
triumphed over a sizeable (crippled) monster, and did not take kindly to any tarnishing of 
its glory. Academy instructors might be discreetly close-mouthed about the caricature of 
leadership role-modeled by their Commander-in-Chief. But academy ethics (and law) 
instructors can’t well finesse questions about their government’s official military policy 
and its (re)conception of the basic principles of jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post 
bellum, policies whose implementation looms as the lot of their students. How is a 
coherent explanation of the military’s professional ethos to proceed when its basic 
principles are being violated, clipped, shaved and/or explicitly (if not publicly) 
contradicted by its current leaders? That hypothetical is an “academic question” with a 
vengeance. It has not been asked with the urgency it merits.
Quite apart from the occasional, circumstantial, external political pressures, the 
interplay of moral principles, military rules and policies, and pedagogical goals poses 
endless nice moral and pedagogical challenges for PMEE. For example, many a moral 
issue is ill-suited for academy ethics courses because the military has answered the 
question. There are sensible institutional rules that need to be impressed upon students 
since so many outstanding, upstanding young Americans enter the academies with scary 
assumptions. From Day 1 as Plebes onward they are told a few thousand times that all 
lying within the military is verboten.  They don’t dare dispute that, yet  in six or so 
sophomore ethics classes I had polled,  never less than 50% and often almost 80% 
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thought it fine for the military to paternalistically lie to the press and Congress (“They 
can’t handle the truth” or be trusted with it.)  Getting through to student skeptics and 
cynics that the Navy really condemns categorically lying in those contexts is beyond the 
most talented civilian instructor. It takes a trusted Navy Captain or Admiral to give the 
official policy credence. Delivering such important messages is wasted time in a 
philosophy course. Of course philosophical questions can still be asked here, but to what 
pedagogical end? Military professionalism encourages independent thought, but officers 
are not encouraged to think lying to Congress a live option, a proper object of 
deliberation any time one is called to the Capitol.23
Philosophy: One pervasive constraint, perhaps the greatest handicap PMEE 
labors under, is the fault, not of the military or its ethos or external pressures, but of 
philosophers. The available intellectual resources for PMEE seem to me in a sorry state. 
Compared to other areas of applied ethics, the literature of military ethics has been 
intellectually underwhelming, despite having originated centuries earlier. The available 
relevant theories, concepts, distinctions, analyses, arguments and counter-arguments thus 
far are not exemplars of philosophical depth, rigor, insight or sophistication. I see little 
hope for their utility as a guide for professionals perplexed by serious moral dilemmas 
not resolvable by applications of moral common sense. (All the dilemmas derive from 
common sense; untying the knots takes an uncommonly nimble mind.)  
Our ethical theories are all written within and about civilian society. They are 
preoccupied with the opposition of self and other, I versus everyone else. The military 
cannot sponsor that perspective. It subordinates the self, and legitimates only oppositions 
relating to military affiliation – the others versus my nation, my corps, my ship, crew, 
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mates, comrades. Military affiliations are moral bonds, assigned, not chosen. Loyalties 
with your comrade, squad, ship, service, nation are axioms of practical reasoning. An 
officer’s daily moral dilemmas are conflicts, not of Prudence versus Justice (or Morality 
in general) but of Loyalty vs Justice or Honesty or some other impartial virtue. On many 
matters of special concern for PMEE, much of the best work is quite recent and remains 
to be tested. Meanwhile academy instructors must be forgiven their fumbling attempts to 
navigate students through the moral reefs when esteemed ethicists supply charts calling to
mind 14th century cartography.
There is a pressing need for morally thoughtful military professionals with 
substantial intellectual abilities – the officers who, hopefully, attain the highest ranks – to 
join with ethical theorists and start reconsidering matters of military ethics with greater 
seriousness, openness, and sustained reflection. We're seeing a new wave of rigorous, 
scholarly assaults on the simplistic absolutism of prevailing dogma. Writings like those in
this volume and others are presently but a ripple lapping the distant shores of academia, 
rarely reaching the mainland of the military and mass media. That's how intellectual 
movements always begin, including the ones that eventually drive social and political 
revolutions. Noticed or not, the worrisome truth is that those academic arguments are not 
readily rebutted and dismissed. They have in fact already demolished all the old defenses 
walled with bluff and bluster. Immediate refortification is a strategic imperative. Right 
now, the armory of the professional military conscience is exposed, its last bulwark a 
faith increasingly threatened with becoming blatantly delusional.
Competence: The failings in PMEE are not philosophers’ alone. Though rarer 
than in the public at large, some active officers, in the academies as well as outside, have 
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a tenuous grasp of the basic ideas of Jeffersonian liberalism. With some, the intellectual 
grip is sufficiently tight, but their sympathies lie elsewhere.24 With others, the sympathies 
are sincere enough, but they haven’t much taste or talent for critical analysis of basic 
values and principles. 
USNA has lagged behind its sister academies because its core ethics course, the 
prime opportunity for “free” thought interrupting indoctrination, has never been turned 
over to instructors versed in this intellectually daunting subject. Instead, senior officers, 
most with hardly more preparation than their students, remain in close control, ill-trained 
and ill-disposed to lead their charges in thinking through departures from right-think 
more radical than center-left Democrats. For all their very considerable native 
intelligence, they are under-equipped for much rigorous, dispassionate re-examination of 
their profession's moral axioms. The explanation for this may be more crass than sinister: 
in the judgment of some well-placed senior officers, the academy has run the course on 
the cheap. Penny-wise, pound-foolish economizing imperils the whole mission. 
The native intelligence of such instructors is ample (though likely below the self-
assessments of successful careerists), but intelligence comes in many kinds, many not 
helpful here, and some talent is needed, and more knowledge than any instructor’s 
summer training course can provide. Only occasionally do any have near the tiny training
expected of officer ethics instructors at USMA and USAFA. USNA’s tendency to 
discount this and suppose that years of personal experience as a commander making 
momentous decisions will (more than?) compensate for a lack of book-learning is itself 
evidence of ignorance of the subject matter and its intellectual demands: a case of not 
knowing what you don’t know. 
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Take one pervasive deficiency especially threatening at a military school. Far 
more than at secular civilian schools, academy ethics courses are rightly concerned that 
their encouragement of critical thought about fundamental principles not encourage the 
spread of moral relativism or subjectivism from the culture to the campus. With its 
responsibility for life and death, the military’s mood is too grave, too earnest (too much 
given to sanctimoniousness) to brook indulgence in any attenuated sense of 
righteousness, or doubts of the reality of duty or the sanctity of honor. And mere belief in 
there being right answers isn’t enough. Our military wants its personnel to believe that 
the answers it supplies are right, or, in any case, what comes to the same, those answers 
are to be acted upon. 
But to belay the students’ (justifiable or excusable) suspicions of being graded on 
giving the moral answers matching their instructors’ beliefs, they are reassured over and 
over that “there are no right or wrong answers here”. The trouble is, to say that (and 
worse, to make a mantra of it) is to leave the students baffled how there could be any 
value in their moral reasoning course: How could reasoning be improved when all 
conclusions are equally good? Warning neophyte instructors against self-defeating 
reassurances is easy enough, but insufficient, for this is a philosophically delicate matter. 
Considerable sophistication is needed to keep the intelligibility and credibility of moral 
objectivism afloat while piloting 20+ hours of moral debates through treacherous 
minefields of reasonable moral disagreement trailing translucent tripwires.
The problems here get depressingly resolved in the academy extracurricular 
character development programs which are supposed to complement the required 
curricular ethics course taught, or at least overseen, by philosophically trained instructors.
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At all the academies, responsibility for the extracurricular programs is given to earnest 
officers having minimal philosophical sophistication and thus prey to the attractions of 
popularized instructional materials by patently second- and third-rate ethicists -- moral 
cookbooks with nifty mnemonic aids, short order recipes a 10 year old can follow, 
indigestible distortions of moral concepts, obliterations of crucial distinctions, etc. Here 
the reassurances that no answer is right or wrong constantly risk exposure as fraudulent 
by the instructors’ not-so-subtle steering of discussion toward a preferred conclusion.
Some of this is rectifiable by sponsoring further faculty education. The benefits 
might well be substantial. They are likely to be limited. Liberating the moral and 
conceptual imagination of a mind that’s made the grade with 10- 20-30+ years of 
habituated rigidities is a Herculean task. That mindset is not designed for teaching 
reasoning about the matters most threatening for military professionals. In class and out, 
senior officers of impeccable integrity, fully deserving all the respect due their rank, who 
elsewhere may display estimable intellectual agility, commonly become dogmatic (and 
testy) about simplistic moral absolutes. They may obdurately refuse to reconsider the 
legalistic rule that, when faced with a directive they deem morally unconscionable, 
officers must first exhaust official channels, and failing that, then the sole legitimate 
alternatives are compliance or resignation. They resist contemplating circumstances 
where compliance is morally impossible and resignation is morally irresponsible—where 
it's just not good enough to just walk away. 
Our academies exhibit astonishing moral seriousness and fearlessness in making 
their students ponder the propriety of the German generals' attempted assassination of 
Hitler. Too often the exercise is wasted, for their mentors seem not so much flummoxed 
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as incapable of wrapping their minds around the conundrum. Commanders may prefer to 
believe that they have no real need to consider seriously such circumstances. Perhaps, 
God willing, unless they play with abstract theory, it would do them no good to think of 
such things. Would that they could rest confident that God is on our side, now and 
forever.
The academies repeatedly display surprising boldness in the questions they make 
students consider, but the boldness gets vitiated and the surprise turns to disappointment, 
when instructors rely on the dodgy answers. Academy teaching stresses that, unlike an 
enlistee who swears to obey the chief executive, midshipmen, cadets and officers vow to 
uphold and defend the Constitution. So, it’s alleged, their allegiance is to the 
Constitution, not to a chief executive’s orders that may conflict with it. Serious moral 
thought does not end there. When the government will not recognize any such conflict is 
this legalism any better than a transparent fig leaf? Within the academies and without, it 
seems too little considered (perhaps it’s too dispiriting) that the price of the purity and 
completeness of our officers’ de jure political neutrality is their being de jure and de  
facto pawns of the political party led by their Commander-in-Chief. 
Was it really a live option for a general or admiral to refuse to direct his troops to 
participate in the invasion of Iraq (Grenada, Panama, whatever) on the grounds of the 
illegality of the chief executive’s order? The premises of such refusals cannot but be 
controversial, but they needn’t be unreasonable or mistaken. Yet, however reasonable the 
claim in theory, does it matter when in fact no Supreme Court would dare question an 
executive directive to use American troops against another people – unless perhaps the 
directive blatantly contravened some contemporaneous Congressional limitation of 
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military action? Short of that, while a subsequent Court might reverse it, no Supreme 
Court would stand alone against a current Presidential military adventure. (Expecting 
more moral integrity from our military than from our courts is symptomatic of psychotic 
political naïveté.)
Consider a case straddling the border between jus ad bellum and jus in bello: 
Could U.S. Air Force Major Hal Knight have successfully defended disobeying his 
secretly delivered orders from Nixon/Kissinger (to execute the illegal bombing of 
Cambodia without the knowledge of the Strategic Air Command) on the grounds that the 
orders were not a Constitutionally authorized exercise of executive power? More to the 
point: Would it have been reasonable for Knight to stake his career on the hope that he 
would prevail in the Courts? Perhaps he could have harbored some hope that after (long 
after) the war a Court might vindicate him, but is an unfounded hope of eventual cold 
comfort enough to sustain a sense of dishonor in getting along by going along?
Knight faced a 2 x 3 decision matrix. I've seen each of Knight's six options find 
sincere defenders in a room of 30+ morally earnest senior U.S. Naval and Marine 
officers.  To my mind, such disunity and confusion are healthy, hopeful symptoms of the 
progress of military professionalism. Midshipmen are made to mull over this matrix. 
Debates amongst themselves are encouraged, but they are not made privy to their 
mentors' disarray. On the contrary, I saw no effort to have midshipmen directly observe 
the moral disarray among senior officers on this matter or any other. What I saw looked 
like an unspoken policy of muffling such exhibitions and maintaining some illusion of a 
uniform understanding and acceptance of this military’s moral code.
Honesty: Military professionalism subserves military proficiency, so it 
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permits and promotes independent thought only insofar as a departure from uniform 
thought contributes to military proficiency. That holds across the academy.  Academy 
leaders worry about heresy. They especially worry about the prevalence of student 
accusations of institutional hypocrisy. They appreciate that nothing so undermines their 
efforts at ethos inculcation than the rife, frank student cynicism fed by perceptions of 
inconsistencies in the regulations, or their applications, or between official preachments 
and actual practice. The leaders strive for a single, consistent message delivered, in word 
and deed, by every staff member up and down the line, civilian and military.
The goal may be worthy. Its attainment is a fantasy when self-deception reigns. 
The hardest thing is to recognize, let alone appreciate, that the higher the standard, the 
lower the tolerance for shortfall, the more likely that the standard setter, like everyone 
else, will trip up and fall short, or seem to do so in some eyes -- and also the more likely 
he won’t see it. The standards we avow are the damnedest things. They’re sure to bite us 
in our but’s. We don’t know how to formulate fool proof rules, particularly moral ones. 
We keep finding new exceptions, or making them, ‘but’ by ‘but’. Whatever we may think,
we cannot survey all that they imply. We don’t see everywhere they’ll take us, and least 
of all how it will look to others. The more rigorist we are, the more we resist apologizing 
for running afoul of our own rules, and resist acknowledging that we’ve done anything of
the sort. We’re aided and abetted in persuading ourselves and others by the endless 
options for alternative interpretation and rationalization supplied by logic and language. 
Meanwhile that supplier works against us by providing unanticipated possibilities of 
“misinterpretations” of our actions and intentions.
No school matches the academies’ concern with fidelity, truthfulness, honesty. No
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civilian organization is as insistent about it as the military with its demands for automatic,
absolute trust up and down every command chain. Dishonesty and distrust in the military 
can be fatal, disastrous. Of course, since the military has vital secrets to keep, and 
enemies to deceive, and Presidential politics to serve, and so on, military leaders must 
deal with all sorts of dicey questions about candor, not all of which are neatly solved by 
silence. Of more immediate interest to the future officers it trains are the conundrums 
about candor at the academies.
The costs of dishonesty in its ranks understandably dispose the military to insist 
on honesty where civilians regard the matter as more morally ambiguous – or not really 
the heavy-duty moral issue the academies make of it. The academies have great difficulty
(and mostly don’t try) avoiding being moralistic when their real concern is with “good 
order and discipline” and what they consider the proper functioning of the organization. 
They create an intensely regimented life, with all kinds of petty rules and restrictions 
inconceivable at civilian schools. There may be good enough reason for all or most of it, 
even though infractions are generally utterly harmless actions in themselves and their 
natural consequences. And there may be reason enough for the academies to demand not 
only compliance with the regulations, however arbitrary they be, but also complete 
truthfulness about any noncompliance, whether by a student or by any classmate. The 
stage is thus set for dramas, played again and again, between the institution and its 
students, who are naturally appalled by the prospect of ratting on classmates and close 
friends for their harmless peccadilloes. To their imperfectly acculturated minds, the 
higher-ups are demanding full disclosure about matters of no importance were it not for 
the rules, despite the searing breach of loyalty and the consequences of betrayal. (Even 
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minor infractions can have decidedly unpleasant sanctions, including, if repeated, 
expulsion.) To the authoritarian mind, the only conflict is between a higher loyalty to the 
institution, the whole over any of its parts vs. a misplaced loyalty to the miscreant, who 
cannot be a real friend, a truly loyal classmate, when he puts you in a position where you 
must lie to protect him. (At other times and places the authority’s attitude is called 
blaming the victim.)
When an institution raises the standards this high, it invites charges of hypocrisy, 
for bullshit from bureaucrats is inevitably as routine here as elsewhere. As at other 
schools, whether addressing students or staff, Deans and other officials regularly avoid 
frank representations of the real reasons for their decisions when those reasons are 
unpopular or embarrassing. No doubt their flexibility with the truth is often well-
meaning: being upfront can be painful, even brutal, and to little good effect. Elsewhere 
we welcome the costs of the conventional facades, where all but the most naïve know 
(and know that each other knows) that what is said is other than truth unvarnished. But 
those conventions have heavier costs in a culture of highly moralized truth telling. (So 
does grade inflation in classrooms and in fitness reports in the fleet.) The rampant 
cynicism of cadets and midshipmen about such matters is infamous and unmatched at any
civilian school I’ve heard of
As elsewhere, officials often avoid outright lies by evasion, stealth, subterfuge 
and secrecy.  Far more than elsewhere, the academies have felt needs and real powers to 
keep truth from coming to light. The usual concerns about institutional repute are 
magnified in the military, where whistle-blowing risks being taken for a breach of 
national security and bad-mouthing sounds downright unpatriotic. Our military 
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academies are, like no other, the schools of this nation, so their PR anxieties rim paranoia.
(The fretting becomes comedic at the academy imperiled by proximity to Capitol Hill and
the national press corps.) As elsewhere, some institutional self-protectiveness may be 
reasonable and defensible. It bears special risks and costs when constrained candor must 
be reconciled with denying cadets and midshipmen any right to stay silent to protect the 
mates with whom mutual loyalty is a must. 
Humility: Among the more ironic instances of institutional looseness with the
truth is the puffery, deemed A-OK, indeed de rigueur from the CNO down to Associate 
Deans, of proclaiming the Naval Academy to be, not merely fit and proper schooling for 
future officers, nor merely very good, but nothing short of the very finest college 
education in this or any nation. School officials everywhere indulge in exaggerations, but 
none I’ve heard in my many semesters and campuses comes close to the self-
congratulatory excesses of the naval leadership. They seem captive to a fragile vanity, 
terrified that, unless the school’s excellence in every dimension is unmatched, its 
graduates – and Naval service and nation - could not be properly proud of the school. 
USMA and USAFA, I gather, exercise no greater modesty.
Meanwhile, faculty (who weren’t educated at the academy) are not so self-
deluded to bethink themselves stellar, or any better than competent and respectable. 
(Predictably, studies akin to weapons engineering have more exceptional faculty.) Rarely 
are academy instructors besieged by offers from research universities like Stanford or 
elite small college like Haverford. Some have competent judges say nice things about 
their work, but seldom are words like ‘world class’ used of them by the very best in their 
field. They take pride in their teaching without delusions of their upper level classes 
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being marvels of erudition and acuity. Their pedagogical strengths and shortcomings are 
well suited for their students’ needs and capabilities. They know the intellectual quality of
what they give their students isn’t world class, and so neither is what the students give 
back. What else could be expected when the native talents of the students, while well 
above national norms, are like those of their faculty: few have the raw brainpower of their
peers at Cal Tech? What else could be expected when traits other than intelligence are, 
quite properly, weighted more in academy admissions, and (the flip side of that) when 
brilliant high schoolers are generally bright enough to know that the academies are not 
where you go if your priorities are primarily intellectual? Exam periods excepted, 
academy libraries are lonely halls.
Some lapses from strict veracity about themselves might be excused as of a piece 
with the hyperbolic bravado befitting a profession where finishing less than first is fatal. 
That excuse looks lame when the leaders behave as though they actually believed their 
public boasts, when they roll out their defenses (a favorite being that classes at elite 
schools are taught by graduate students, not the prestigious professors) -- reasoning 
inducing slack-jawed wonderment at whom these leaders spend their days talking to if 
they don’t know or don’t care when they insult their audience’s intelligence.25 
(Authoritarian organizations are always at risk of having institutional authority kidnap 
epistemic authority.) 
How can anyone with the acuity of senior military officers believe that the 
intellectual vitality of student life at our premier civilian schools could be attained and 
maintained after laying on the entire student body all of the academies’ required hours of 
physical training and military activity, from marching to shoe shining and daily room 
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cleaning? How can one imagine that that miracle could be managed with a student body 
whose native intellect measures at the low end of the brighter student bodies, and a 
faculty of little intellectual distinction? Those questions are serious, not rhetorical.26
My own (decidedly unidiosyncratic) sense is that academy leaders indulge in too 
much mutual back-slapping and institutionalized self-delusion. It’s not a coincidence that 
those in charge are academy alums with no personal experience of civilian undergraduate 
education, and usually no more than a year or so at a civilian graduate school. Mostly 
they are clueless what it’s like to spend years of semesters with a teacher or three of truly 
world-class brilliance. (ROTC graduates of civilian schools are scarce above academy 
middle management.) Their efforts to remedy their nescience compete with self-
protective proclivities and policies like foregoing external peer review for faculty 
retention, promotion and tenure. When a Provost confidently insists that they (unlike 
other schools?) need no such data, one can only bite one’s tongue to keep from 
disingenuously asking: But, but sir, how would it hurt to get this extra, inexpensive, 
independent info? This admiral gets testy when pressed.27
All this puffery may be hardly more heinous than the local hamburger shack 
billing itself as the home of the best burgers in town, or the nation, or the cosmos. Still, 
our academies boast of being houses of the highest standards of honor, so it would be 
fitting and proper if they settled for less extravagant boosterisms. They cannot compete 
with Miami in football or Chicago in economics, but they have no need to. The 
academies do not, as whole institutions, compete against civilian schools, no more than 
Walla Walla vies with Wharton. The bald truth about these schools is plenty to be proud 
of. The undergraduate education is better than civilian professors might expect. It could 
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be better still, and the nation would do well to support it. That’s not going to happen if the
academies aren’t more honest with themselves and the public. 
If they are to be duly proud of the integrity and honesty they aspire to inspire in 
their graduates, it behooves them to embody those virtues even at the cost of due humility
in their other accomplishments. If there was ever a time and place for a people to resist 
the deadliest sins of pride and vanity, it is now and here, in this nation and its military. 
There is no better place than the academies to begin teaching those virtues so unnatural 
for warriors: modesty and humility about one’s wisdom, goodness, powers and value. 28
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1
 This whole volume and particularly my own writings owe much to many people. Few anthologists 
have been so blessed to have each contributor be a paragon of anthological virtue, prompt in response, 
cooperative in revision, punctual in manuscript delivery, and supererogatory in comment on my own 
essays.  I insert my acknowledgements here because I have been helped here most of all. This essay is 
written from the peculiar perspective of a professional ethicist hired to advise an institution on its ethics
education programs.  It is designed to inform and engage a general public about matters that concern 
them of which they are ignorant, but it is addressed to my client (and other administrators of PMEE 
programs) as a consultant’s final report on his findings. So, it takes an occasional tangent off the central
theme of conflicting imperatives to report some related matter of importance. So too, as an advisor’s 
report, it takes liberties in its tone and trappings sure to scandalize scholars. Where possible and 
appropriate, scholarly canons are sometimes met, but mostly the essay is riddled with reports from 
unnamed sources, and controversial opinions unsupported by due documentation. Skeptical readers 
have only my assurance that my provocative claims have been properly vetted by very well positioned 
participants at all three academies, who would happily have my expressions of gratitude remain private.
While some needling judgments have not met unanimous assent, not a word here is my opinion alone. 
Certainly, my confidantes often become so because of our shared sympathies, so my sources are 
skewed and some judgments represent minority opinions, but none are dismissibly tiny minorities. I am
most indebted to my most severe critics, especially my erstwhile office-mate, Adm. Hank Chiles, USN 
(ret), for his extraordinary patience and generosity with his time, effort, and informational resources 
trying to rectify what he deemed so defective. I am grateful for his saving me from numerous 
embarrassing errors, and regretful that so much remains so disagreeable. Likewise, I am nearly as 
indebted to George Lucas for all his many objections, patience, and generosity. The support, 
encouragement and counsel of Lara Denis and Bredo Johnsen have, as always, been essential. 
2
 This essay is written to be understandable on its own but it is better understood with the background 
of “The Moral Singularity of Military Professionalism”, the preceding chapter here. That essay 
articulates my understanding of the historical context and motivational structure of military 
professionalism-- an understanding here guiding what I think worth looking at, and how I look at it, 
and represent it. If my lens here looks off kilter, check the prior chapter.
3
 See my review of Alan Donagan’s The Theory of Morality in Nous, May, 1983, 303-08.
4
 Feeling humbled by a course grade ‘F’ is not unusual or pathological; for some of us, a midterm ‘C’ or
‘B’ is due cause for shame and humiliation. The point here is only a reminder that these matters have 
more complexity than we realize at first thought.
5
 To sharpen the conflict, the dialectic in the text conflates distinct issues: What specific trait(s) in an 
officer maximize his professional proficiency? What regimen most effectively induces that trait. 
Regimen relaxation derived significantly from an altered assessment of the optimal leadership and 
managerial traits, traits better developed by regimen relaxation. The text collapses the different ways 
demands of respect enter and impact these issues. 
6
 Some moral sweating  may be induced by passages like the third prescription of “Toward Perpetual 
Peace” that standing armies be abolished “in time” – and some stomach knotting at its  clause saying 
that being hired to kill or be killed “seems to involve” using people as mere means. Still, Kant does not 
issue an unequivocal categorical condemnation of military service. Most pertinent here, Kant’s 
comments directly  on the condition of freedom within the military structure provoke no worries about 
our current practices, except, perhaps, at the margins: e.g., some current constraints on an officer’s 
public political speech  seem to restrict the broad use of  “public reason” by officers advocated in 
“What is Enlightenment?”. 
7
  The figures from the "Annual Report to GAO; Office of Institutional Research, U.S. Naval Academy"
are: for 2003, costs per USNA midshipman: $291,289; per USAFA cadet: $346,652; per USMA cadet 
$383,042. With approximately 4200 enrolled at each academy, the four year totals are: USNA- 
$1,223,413,800; USAFA-$1,455,938,400; USMA-$1,608,785,600. Yearly overall total: 
$1,072,034,400. Why does it cost us over 20% more to produce Air Force officers than Navy/Marine 
officers? and over 33% more for Army officers than Navy/Marine officers? Nice questions for which I 
have yet discovered no sensible answers. Caveat: The 2004 DoD commissioned study by the Tench 
Francis School of Business, Comparative Analysis of ROTC, OCS and Service Academies as 
Commissioning Sources, notes that such numbers, and others reported in the study and cited below, are 
problematic. 
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 Introduction to the chapter on jus ad bellum in the USNA course text Ethics for Military Leaders, 
Pearson Custom Publishers, Boston, 2002.
9
  Just as this book’s manuscript was readied for delivery to the publisher, the internet was filling with 
reactions to a Thomas E. Ricks’ column, “Why We Should Get Rid of West Point”, Washington Post, 
April 16, 2009 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/04/16/ 
AR2009041603483 .html>. Ricks argues, like others before, that, compared to ROTC and OCS, all the 
academies are woefully cost-ineffective producers of officers. Reader reactions, pro and con, heated 
and humorous, are rich with anecdotes, and some new data is coming to light as I write. I learned of the
Tench Francis study cited above and below from a response to Ricks’ critics by Bruce Fleming, a 
USNA civilian professor notorious for unflattering publications about his employer, yet previously 
unknown to me. 
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/27/usna_prof_to_usma_flack_ricks_is_basically_right .
10
  See John M. Doris’ Lack of Character (Cambridge, 2002).  Doris and his allies may be exaggerating 
the philosophical and moral significance of some socio-psychological research. See John Sabini and 
Maury Silver, "Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued," Ethics 115 (April 2005) for criticism and a 
bibliography of a growing debate that aspiring molders of character better ponder carefully.
11
 Despite yearly teaching a couple classes about Aristotle on virtue, officers don’t balk at research 
proposals declaring that virtues are abilities, and failures to act virtuously are due solely to a deficiency
of moral courage. They listen respectfully to “experts” selling assessments of academy character 
development programs using the same kind of tests used for assessing academic programs. They do not
readily appreciate the import of the few basic certainties: e.g., propensities and abilities are 
metaphysically and epistemologically disparate things; virtues are peculiar propensities: behavior in 
one situation apparently exhibiting a virtue is an unreliable predictor of the person’s passing a “test” of 
that virtue in some other kind of situation. A perspicuous specification of virtue propensities eludes us. 
12
 Academy leadership textbooks do commend due humility, but it ranks way down the list of traits 
regularly emphasized. Hopes of our military’s appreciating the military value of “a degree of 
intellectual humility” would be more encouraged if its current golden boy could manage a tad more 
enthusiasm than: “not at all a bad quality in those who may be charged in the future with some very 
weighty responsibilities.” (David H. Petraeus, “Beyond the Cloister”, http://www.the-american-
interest.com/article.cfm?piece=290.)  Actually, in context his backhanded understatement is plainly 
tamping down the preachiness of his message about a matter he thinks of great importance. 
13
 A disposition to consider the opposing opinions of others, and an ability to prevail in open debate that
encourages the disposition are relatively readily measured (compared to traits like courage, honesty, 
integrity, justice.) Factoring for influences is challenging. We may reasonably assume, but cannot 
readily demonstrate, that these benefits are affected less by the institutional setting of instruction and 
more by the instruction’s quality (an attribute not easily measured apart from such effects). Still, a fair 
conjecture is that the better civilian schools whose philosophy faculty’s PhD training enhances the 
necessary (but not sufficient) Socratic skills for teaching moral reasoning may have an edge over  
military schools where fewer ethics instructors have near as much essential training.
14
  Turgay Demirel concluded that "the magnitude differences in retention between the five major 
commissioning sources often are not large. Moreover, the direction of the retention effect often varies 
across the services for each commissioning program." ("Abstract", A Statistical Analysis of Officer 
Retention in the U.S. Military, Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2002.) Later,
Zafer Kizikaya concluded that, for those commissioned in the period 1981-2001, USMA "graduates 
have the lowest retention rates, whereas OCS graduates have the highest retention rates". Yet, USMA 
"graduates are more likely to be promoted to Lieutenant Colonel than those from other sources." 
("Abstract", An Analysis of the Effect of Commissioning Sources on Retention and Promotion of U.S. 
Army Officers, Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2004.) The 2004 Tench 
Francis study cited above mentions many of the obstacles to forming a meaningful ROI measure for 
comparing the academies with ROTC and OCS, but provides some of the pertinent data, including 
evidence that the advantage of academy graduates in attaining the general/flag officer ranks has 
diminished. See also <http://www.truthout.org/article/west-point-grads-exit-service-high-rate> for a 
2007 news report on the sharp drop in USMA graduate retention rates. After their 5 year commitment, 
35% of the classes of 2000 and 2001 got out.
15
  Other factors affecting promotion may be surprising. Ibrahim Korkmaz found that "commissioning 
source has significant strong effect on survival rates with Naval Academy graduates have [sic] a better 
survival rate than other commissioning sources." ("Abstract", Analysis of the Survival Patterns of 
United States Naval Officers, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005).
16
 This analysis may supply the needed missing premises for the conclusion of Robert L. Goldich, The 
DoD Service Academies: Issues for Congress, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
Library of Congress, February 6, 1997. 
17They'd be still brighter if our academies shed the penchants of civilian schools. How exactly the 
academies' mission is furthered by recruiting athletes is not obvious when the academic admission 
scores of almost half of them are in the lower 30% of their class, a predictor of a lower graduation rate. 
(Data reported in GAO-03-1000, "Military Education: DOD Needs to Enhance Performance Goals and 
Measures to Improve Oversight of Military Academies," released September 10, 2003.)
18
 The dialectical options are endless, when, for example, many military personnel and civilians insist 
that our founding documents are products of their current conception of Christianity rather than 
expressions of nonsectarian Enlightenment principles.
19
 This may be entailed by the moral precariousness of the military, See Ch 7 herein.
20See Erik Eckholm, “As Recruiting Suffers, Military Reins In Abuses at Boot Camp”, New York Times,
July 26, 2005 <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/26/national/26training.html>.
21
 Ibid.
22That lesson needn’t be a simplistic absolutism banning exceptional acts in exceptional circumstances. 
Military honor might not be tarnished by resort to drastic punishments to keep some crew of brutish 
conscripts in line sufficiently for mission accomplishment. If we want officers of truly high moral 
character, we’ve got to habituate them to complex, nuanced reasoning, not sound-bite moral slogans. 
This is hard enough to teach anywhere. Teaching it in the military is harder for reasons that make the 
teaching more important.
23
 The distribution of labor within academy PMEE that might seem somewhat suspicious may result 
from reasonable curricular preferences or inattention. The core philosophy courses on ethics devote 
significant time to virtues and character traits like honesty, loyalty, justice and courage, whose 
valuations in the military are more similar to than different from civilian valuations. Inculcation of the 
values, ideals and virtues that are far more distinctively military virtues and prized traits – like 
discipline, commitment, toughness, leadership traits, etc. – are left to other academy programs. Such 
matters are not subjected to philosophical reflection. They might be vindicated by such reflection, but 
I’ve sensed no interest in putting them to the test.
24
  That comes out in the still too frequent incidents of military officers, including academy 
administrators, allowing their religious convictions to color their commands or the esprit they aim to 
instill. The 2004-7 reports of coercive evangelizing at USAFA are exceptional mainly in the notoriety 
they achieved.  Even among the more thoughtful leaders, there linger hankerings for greater 
“spirituality” in the military and its academies. Their reassurances that they mean some nonsectarian 
notion of spirituality lose credibility when they prove incapable of articulating a conception inoffensive
to nonbelievers. Their attitude is reminiscent of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s: “Our government makes no 
sense unless it is founded on a deeply felt religious faith – and I don’t care what it is.” 
25
  Just for starters, for those entirely ignorant of such matters: (I)  The academies are properly 
compared, not to public universities with 30,000-50,000+ students, but to respected colleges with 3000-
5000 students where graduate student teachers are exceptional, and (II) the grad student teaching 
assistants at respected research universities generally (1) teach only one of the weekly three hours of 
classes, (2) have more interest in, talent for, and training in their subject matter than many academy 
officer instructors (who rarely have more than the M.A. training many grad student teachers have, and 
often lack the undergraduate major in their subject normally needed for graduate admission), (3) are not
burdened by responsibilities unrelated to their teaching remotely as massive as academy officer 
instructors’.  
26
 Many respondents to Ricks (op. cit.) ridicule him for referring to Gen. David Petraeus while likening 
West Point to a community college. They are all cock-sure that the Petraeus Princeton graduate degree 
after his West Point studies is proof positive of West Point’s academic excellence. Their certainty 
bespeaks ignorance of Petraeus’ perceptions (op. cit.) What reads as the most heartfelt part of a 
heartfelt essay promoting the value of civilian graduate studies for military officers is his report of the 
humbling responses (e.g., D) the Princeton professors gave the first papers of this top West Point 
scholar, who’d just won the “white briefcase” as first of some thousand students at Army’s Command 
and General Staff College. His morality tale of learning some intellectual humility sits prominently in 
an essay meriting required reading at the academies and elsewhere. Readers may conjecture that other 
lessons were learned as well. Petraeus writes more diplomatically than I need to, yet candidly for 
someone in his position: e.g., “Being part of a wide-open culture of discovery can be a very 
stimulating, challenging experience for those of us who attended West Point, which (tongue in cheek) 
we felt represented 150 years of tradition unhampered by progress. Of course, West Point has changed 
enormously over the years and it is a true national treasure, but despite the varied curriculum and 
experiences it provides, it is not an institution that puts creativity, individuality and discovery before all
else.”
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Some sixty years ago, Adm. James L. Holloway III – who authored the Holloway Plan that 
transformed Naval  education, then served as USNA Superintendent and later as CNO – dreamt of 
making what had been a military trade school into “MIT on the Severn” (the river by the campus).  
USNA is rightly proud of its leagues of academic and cultural progress by its “Academic Revolution” 
and “Professional Revolution” of the 1960’s and subsequent efforts. No one is well served when 
Holloway’s successors now run this ship under the Bush-era banner: “Mission Accomplished”. (See   
Todd A. Forney, The Midshipman Culture and Educational Reform: The U.S. Naval Academy: 1946-
76, University of Delaware Press, 2004; H. Michael Gelfand , Sea Change at Annapolis: The United 
States Naval Academy, 1949–2000, University of North Carolina Press, 2006.)
28
 Though not a large or random sample, it is worth reporting that vet respondents to Ricks (op. cit.) 
reporting personal experience preponderantly favor fresh academy graduates over their ROTC peers as 
better prepared to be junior officers. Few report differences of competence persisting among senior 
officers sorted by commissioning path. Differences in character are seldom mentioned, with one 
notable exception. Repeatedly, academy graduates are alleged to be hampered as young officers by a 
snobbish attitude of superiority.                                                                                                                   
